PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015) at once: blending them, experimenting with new forms of exchange, and making a point of getting acquainted with other researchers who share our intentions. We are here today to discuss what philo-performance is. First of all, I will venture to say that none of us here is fully satisfied with that term. It sounds attractive and yet somewhat inadequate. Yesterday, in her presentation on the young queer stage in France, Muriel Plana talked to us about a "perfo-conference" during which body language and articulated speech intermingled (Plana 2014) . In a similar vein, the Ajàso group from Toulouse University presented us with a documentary film directed by Gentian Koçi and focusing on that collective desire to take philosophy beyond the university walls and let it meet 'the Outside' (http://tpp2014.com/fr/projection-de-films/). How can thought excite our senses and allow us to channel our various responses into a collective creative act? The time has come to share our experience. Who would like to start the discussion?
Camille Louis: Thank you, Flore, for initiating this event. I am a playwright and a PhD candidate at Paris 8 university, where I am also a lecturer. My dissertation is entitled: La Recomposition du politique dans la décomposition des politiques ("Re-membering Politics While Dismembering Policies"). I am studying the way practical, aesthetic approaches to politics, such as those exemplified in contemporary artistic practices, may initiate a new brand of political thought by paying as much attention to bodies, gestures and the performative dimensions of people gathered, as to statements and speeches. Politics and its current evolution are thus freed from the theoretical framework of so-called "political philosophy", according to which nothing actually happens when crowds rise and occupy places. My practice as a dramatist feeds such research and, five years ago, the connection between performance and politics led me to launch an interdisciplinary European research group, "kom.post" (http://kompost.me). The group aims at experimenting with the displacement of philosophy into the field of performance through interactive events, which shed new light on the relationship between spectators, performers and author. When Flore suggested the term "philo-performance", I thought it was very puzzling since some contributors to the present conference take it for granted that philosophy is performative, that there are performative moments in philosophy… Yet I do not feel that this is that obvious. For instance, I have been thinking over Martin Puchner's talk. To him, the performativity of philosophy is to be found in philosophical scenes, namely 'scenes of instruction' (Puchner 2014) . To me, such scenes nonetheless rely on specific relations of power… Muriel Plana's very interesting talk then made us aware of the fact that one of the performative tasks of performance and philosophy might lie in their ability to question stock images and the hierarchy of power inherent in a capitalist society.
This endows performance, as well as any other action initiated by thought and creativity, with a political dimension. And yet, even if performance indeed consists in challenging established ideas, all brands of philosophy are not necessarily performative. Performance philosophy is a controversial, problematic and issue-raising philosophical endeavour that is far from obvious. The term "philo-performance" is interesting insofar as this ultimate blend of philosophy with performance refers us to what distinguishes one from the other, and to the fact that there are common points between them that may be uncovered in the course of our peculiar experiments in search of them. PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015)
Flore Garcin-Marrou: The term "philo-performance" was suggested about ten years ago by Charlotte Hess in a manifesto posted on the website of Zones d'attraction
.
Charlotte Hess: Good afternoon. I am a tango dancer and a performer. I used to study both performing arts and philosophy at Paris 8 University. The group of artists named "philoperformance" came together ten years ago, with the intention to stage thought. We have come a long way since then. The term "philo-performance" is puzzling indeed. It is often said that the performance of thought mainly aims at putting "highbrow" philosophy in people's reach through art. Art is understood as a didactic tool that purports to enlighten people, to explain to people what they are experiencing. What we tried to do is quite the reverse! We attempted to uncover the way any gesture reveals some underlying thought and the way thought might prove performative in that it initiates common, everyday gestures. What I cannot abide, in the common use of the concept, is that "philosophy" is used to mean some academic subject, "highbrow" thought, or rationality. Whereas to me, "philo-performance" is the thought that is to be found in everyday life, in practical experiences, in social scenes which most of all allow us to think through collective experiences and the fact of being together.
Liza Kharoubi: I work as a lecturer in contemporary British theatre at the University of Avignon and I am pleased to be a co-organizer of this conference. The whole event has been conceived as a response to a need for gesture within the realm of philosophy, and of thought in general, in an attempt to uncover what is alive in the act of thinking, the creativity that underlies it, as well as what is inherently speculative in the artistic gesture in particular. The whole project is challenging too. It allows us to probe that space which emerges in-between philosophy and performance, and to correct the view that this merely has to do with "decorating" philosophy with gestures. It is rather about reaching a point when something is actually happening -such is the intent underpinning Alphonso Lingis's work.
Marielle Pélisséro: I am a PhD candidate at Paris Ouest -Nanterre University. I am focusing on the emergence of performance in France since the 1960s, and on the necessity of such a concept and the ways it is used. I am also surveying the relationships initiated by performance between the individuals who take part in a theatre workshop (Labex Arts H2H 2014) . In the course of this conference I chaired the session dedicated to the Gesture research group (Laboratoire du Geste).
Something very interesting happened as far as gesture and speculation are concerned. During that workshop, no participant felt concerned about productivity or results. Instead, that performance time was dedicated to speculation, which resulted in thinking. To me, the concept of "philoperformance" refers to a specific dimension in space and time, where people may at once act and think, make gestures which result in thought. Thought then finds new impetus in other gestures and so on, moving to and fro between thinking and acting. What I do sets me thinking as an individual, but above all as a member of a community. To me, the tension between individual and community is the crux of philo-performance. Nadia Vadori-Gauthier: I am a performer in the group "Corps collectif" ("Collective Body", www.lecorpscollectif.com) and a PhD candidate in Decorative Arts at Paris 8 University. I am also a PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015) coach in Body-Mind Centering and a somatic practitioner. My experience as such illustrates something you pointed out this morning, Flore, a liminal space does exist, where art and philosophy meet, and performance may allow for their practical encounter (Garcin-Marrou 2014b).
To me, they meet in some indefinite space we may never fully grasp, a space that may forever remain out of the reach of articulate speech, a "blind" space, with no preconceived word to describe it, something deeply mysterious which, to me, has to do with life itself. Somatic experience and thought are woven together and cannot be conceived as separate. I believe that the body thinks and that a moving body generates thought, just as thought somatizes and shows through the body.
For my own part, I began by giving up articulate speech, refusing to associate words with things, refusing to abide by preconceived meaning so as to set off toward an area I could not fathom.
Through dancing, I immersed myself in a silence rustling with sensations. At the same time, I
started experimenting with new ways of saying poetry and automatic writing, paying attention to the sounds and the rhythms they were made of, to their texture rather than their meaning. I intended to uncover some ways to "stammer in my own tongue", as Deleuze put it, to create unprecedented spaces where meaning could emerge anew. As a bodily explorer, experiencing a speechless space more and more intensely, I began to feel the need to speak. That is when I turned to philosophy. My encounters with concepts turned out to be thrilling emotional events that themselves amounted to somatic experiencing. The latter actually echoed some thoughts just as some philosophers' thoughts interfered with it, in a constant come-and-go. To me, philoperformance consists of such experiencing which provides an affective body for the concept, not making it a formal entity but rather a medium for transformation -a hub of intensity resulting in a chaos which comes into being as experiencing unfolds. I can refer to several concepts which are constantly evolving so long as I start thinking them. That is a two-way process, in constant motion.
Everything melts away and is composed anew every second. To me, this is where philosophy and performance meet. It is a truly somatic experience and, therefore, thought incarnate. It is an affective encounter insofar as it has the power to affect while being affected.
Amalia Boyer: I work in Colombia. In the 1980s and 1990s, I started research on a group of women with whom I got involved in what has since become known as 'dance theatre'. This could be considered a philo-performance, revolving around the gaps in what gestures convey. Those women were neither actresses nor professional dancers. Busy as they were, they would meet every night for three hours to work by themselves, outside of any institutional framework or paid job. I wanted to address, first of all, the problems they had to face in their daily lives. That protracted collective work resulted in some sort of a creation which stood out against modern, classic or folkloric dancing. I recorded their gestures and then channeled them into performances, that is to say a living form of art. On the one hand, performance and archive sound incompatible since performance cannot be recorded or kept in the archives. On the other hand, it was important to record what those women were doing, for the sake of future generations. This was happening in a place where nobody would think there would have been such performances, where people behave as if the performing arts had never existed. Where does the power of the archive lie in such a context, faced as it is with such conflicts and tension? PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015) I was also wondering about my own role as a philosopher. For that matter, my own work underwent some change too: as I was trying to understand those women's work, I felt the need to work just as they were. I moved on to a new way of writing, to a dramaturgy that had to integrate actions and gestures, and could no longer rely on concepts and words. There was no way I could only comment on that work and this is how I came to present a living archive, turning again to a bodily work I thought I had left behind (I was a dancer for 20 years before I turned to philosophy 20 years before that project). How could I bind together those different experiences? And how could I bind individual and collective experiences?
As I was involved in that work, I came across a very important notion in Caribbean Studies, that of "archipelago", a notion I am particularly fond of: how far is each woman an island? How can each woman feel like an outcast? And how can she then realize, as she confronts a group, that her personal issues are in fact shared by most of the others? How can insularity set people off creating an archipelago? The relationship between archipelago and archive allows us to think of an area of thought rather than its mediations, and of a thorough reorganization of the relations between text, gesture, philosophical and performative practices.
Flore Garcin-Marrou: Such insularity is also ours: it is the very condition of that liminal space in which each of us stands, at the crossroads between performance and philosophy. As Avital Ronell (2006) points out in her interviews with Anne Dufourmantelle, French Theory has proved inspirational in American universities, especially as far as female academics are concerned, let us mention Naomi Schor or Jane Gallop for instance, offering performative conferences, wearing next to nothing but ties, in an attempt to discuss Lacan's "double bind". Is it on purpose that my guests today are all women? Is that crossroads where we stand to be understood as a shelter from maleinspired fictions, as a welcoming space for young researchers out of a job? A controversial question that may find no answer, for what is it here that men could not say? How are we to understand that American "boomerang effect", that is to say the fact that the USA sends us back today all that French Theory has inspired there over the last thirty years? On the whole I would say that philoperformance is a way off the beaten tracks of speculative philosophy and allows us to venture into side streets, narrow and unmarked roads that Avital Ronell calls "back roads" and that lead us not to dissociate thought from physical experience anymore, but rather to reconcile physical rhetoric and conceptual rigour.
Maria Kakogianni: I feel like some kind of parasite here. There are two things I would like to draw attention to: our subject and the question of gesture. I am going to beat around the bush first, as I like to do. What is performance philosophy? That is a question I have never really thought of, one that has never appeared to me as something to think over, no more than performance or performativity. Neither can I avail myself of any artistic practice that may have led me to deal with such issues. Hence the feeling I have of being the odd one out. The issue of performance in philosophy is rather something that came crashing down on me one day, as I was defending my PhD. Alain Badiou asked me: "Is your dissertation installation art or a performance?" That day, I started answering that it was more of an installation (the speculative approach of that dissertation had to do with experimental reading). As time passed, I came to realize that what I had done might PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015) also have been some sort of a gesture. Why? Well, because what my dissertation was dealing with, it was also doing at the same time, which is precisely what Austin calls the "performative".
The second time performativity came crashing down on me was when the French academic establishment argued that my work was unacademic. It did not meet the usual academic standards. What is wrong with my academic gesture? Confronted as we are by the standards our institutions rely on, how should we feel about that failure of a gesture, which was not something I had planned? What can you do when the establishment calls you a "failure"? Someone who is queer did not opt for his or her condition. It just happened that way. And there comes a point when you have to do something about it because the establishment and its standards, which have come to be regarded as natural, mark you out as abnormal or queer. Camille Louis: Once more, philo-performance sounds like something very puzzling. Whether it be some space allowing for an encounter, or something that comes crashing down on you, something that we are going back to, or that space in which we need philosophy… It always makes itself felt as a strong attraction enhancing the fact that such an association is far from self-evident. I think that while talking about philo-performance or trying to define it, we are pointing out the fact that philosophy intrinsically needs to reach out for new spaces to develop in, to try and shape itself in a livelier way, in a more dangerous way. Unless we are acting out again some kind of philosophical trend calling itself "philo-performance", despite the fact that it is only taking up the old philosophers' formula according to which they are more poets than the poets themselves.
Speaking from where I stand, that is to say as a contemporary philosopher, is there any chance one might imagine some way to depose a specific brand of Western thought and the Western "I" that Catherine Malabou was evoking earlier at this Conference (Malabou 2014) , without falling back into some sort of postmodern defeatism? Considering instead that in that "I" -which is not a sovereign "I" -lies some altered power that is pervaded by the other, and that also raises collective issues? There, in that interrelation between philosophy and performance that contaminate each other, does politics come into play -some brand of politics that may not find any practical PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015) expression if we think that only philosophy may be performance. When the body thinks, it may not be any expression of philosophy. Dancing has a way of thinking that is specifically choreographic.
Performance thinks in a specifically performative way. These are the reasons why I feel the need to distinguish performance from philosophy, so as to avoid creating some new monopoly.
Charlotte Hess: I did not mean to impose from the start a shift to the question of gesture, but it is a well-known fact that performance is generally regarded as boiling down to some sort of a language, especially from a philosophical stance. At this stage in our discussion, we have started marking out more clearly the space where we are speaking from when philosophy is at stake. It lies at a distance from academic and purely rational circles. Following Nadia and Amalia's accounts of their respective experiences, especially their somatic experiences, I would like to remind everybody of the fact that the body does not exist. I do not know if we can agree on that point.
Dualisms such as body and mind are not only a way of creating a logical difference for thought.
They also create hierarchies, dependence, domination. What is the body? To put it plainly, if gesture can be distinguished from the movement of a machine, it is because it has gone through psychic, social, perceptual, coordinating dimensions. There is always a background from which gesture emerges. In other words, gestures do not spring from bodies; they actually shape bodies. (Lingis 1994) . To me, the specificity of gesture as compared with machines, with the movement of a machine whatever it is, lies in the fact that gesture addresses someone. Gesture is the main movement of ethics. I believe that this ethical dimension comes first, before politics: ethics endows politics with meaning, opens it up. I have also noticed that all our plenary lectures are given by philosophers, though they are also poets. Admittedly, we have created some new spaces to make room for performance, for arts, for the documentary about philo-performance presented by Ajàso, for the collective reading of Antigonick (Ronell et al 2014) , but we might be to blame too: although we have empowered a non-mainstream brand of philosophical speech -which is an achievement in itself, a conference lecture is still a philosophical speech. All we can do is to make new adjustments, new shifts. This is what we are doing right now for that matter: while shifting speech from its usual form, we are making a new gesture on the part of philo-performance. Should we not question the very way the conference is shaped? Let this lay the foundations for 2017. PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015) Flore Garcin-Marrou: 2016! Camille Louis: Have you not given this any thought? In fact you have… Unsettling the whole conventional thing, giving up formal talks, creating spaces for discussion… I have no doubt that the idea occurred to you.
Charlotte Hess: Admit it! Liza Kharoubi: Alright, we will do our best in 2016.
Esa Kirkkopelto: I come from Helsinki. As I was listening to you, I realized that philo-performance as an issue does not satisfy me. In the course of this 2014 TPP Conference, I have attended some workshops which offered quite beautiful attempts at performing thought. But that raises a few issues, first as regards the way thought relates to arts in general. When it comes to thought and philo-performance, it is often taken for granted that thinking is the privilege of other people: stagedirectors think, choreographers think… Dancers, as for them, just dance and actors act. Thus, philoperformance comes as a liberating process: performers think too. A group of performers is a group that thinks. As a result, everyone's part in a production is to be re-imagined and reassessed. Such We do not stand on the spectator's side or on the performer's. Rather, we stand in-between them.
And this is where thought emerges.
Maria Kakogianni: I would like to answer Camille, first of all, regarding her concern about philoperformance being appropriated by conventional philosophy. I would like to defend an indefensible thesis, harking back to Plato's eviction of the poets from his utopian city. Something has been lost in translation. Throughout the text, Plato toys with the ambiguous meaning of the word "poet" (ποιητής) which both refers to producers and to poets strict sensu. Plato argues that the user (the one who uses something) has better episteme than the producer, the poet, which implies that the actor makes better use of the text. What I mean, and that may also answer Esa Kirkkopelto's remarks on France, is that I do not think that there is any specifically French issue as far as research is concerned. The same happens everywhere, and this is what I call the performativity of norms: standards become such; they settle down until they are regarded as PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015) natural, although they are not. Of course French universities are no more narrow-minded than others. I take it as a matter of fact that any creative gesture is challenging and awkward. First, it is awkward when compared to what we usually call "doing well", "talking well" or "dancing well".
Everything new is challenging, not only artistic novelties. If people blame you for being outside the mainstream when you do something, their sentence comes crashing down on you. As regards that brand of philosophy which tends to appropriate new trends and to impose itself as a panopticon to keep an eye on everybody, assessing and judging all that thinks or does not think, I shall say again that it all depends on what we call philosophy. For example, the 1968 gesture of protest makes it clear that politics thinks for itself and does not need philosophy to draw attention to the fact. Art thinks for itself too… Contrary to dancing, architecture or mathematics, for example, which provide spaces for thought to be performed, philosophy, which I have always considered a stranger, does not have a specific space to shape itself: it emerges in-between spaces. Thus, philosophy is hybrid in essence. There are two brands of philosophy: one that admits to its hybrid nature and one that overestimates itself as the most legitimate way of thinking. Because philosophy is intrinsically in that interplay, in-between those two positions, one of those two brands endeavours to appropriate anything new and to do what Camille dreads… But hybrid philosophy is also here to settle between borders and between bodies. Philosophy is philia, that is to say "love" between the various bodies that form a language. Philosophy does not have a body but it arouses love between bodies. We do not know what a body is, but we sometimes witness what happens when two bodies meet.
Aline Wiame: I come from the Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium. I would like to respond to the issue of gesture, which I am deeply interested in, and notably to the shift from philoperformance to gesture, a shift that Charlotte mentioned when she described her practice. That means a lot to me, because I am not too fond of the term 'philo-performance': I agree that "performance philosophy" works, but I have doubts as far as "philo-performance" is concerned. In Brussels, I have worked most notably with Isabelle Stengers. When she retired last year, she and her research group GECo -a research group in constructivist studies -organized a conference in Cerisy that was entitled "Gestes speculatifs" ("Speculative Gestures", Stengers and Debaise 2013). All her academic circle took part in it, people such as Tobie Nathan, Bruno Latour, Donna Haraway, etc. They had all admitted to the issue of "located gestures". But the meaning that emerged quite spontaneously from the various talks was an idea that Stengers would call an "ecology of practice", that is to say, a speculative gesture. How can we, in our own practice, create a gesture that would be either theoretical or practical in essence? What gestures may be imagined to challenge what does not work in one's own practice? Where, when, why should we make a gesture? The issue was raised by Tobie Nathan in the field of psychiatry, but also by lawyers who discussed the way they should break some rules so as to improve law, setting a precedent to allow for progress. Pondering this, I am realizing that what a speculative gesture and an ecology of practice allow me to think may well be a way to outgrow the question of what performance and philosophy actually are -a question that may itself become a snare since it implies that we keep laying the foundations for their encounter without ever developing the various shapes it may take, knowing that the performer him-or herself speculates too, using speculation as a way to create possibilities, and also as a way to resist critical thought… This is also at the back of the workshop on speculative PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015) story-telling that I offered earlier today, along with Fabrizio Terranova, a workshop that was inspired by Donna Haraway's speculative fabulations. Speculative story-telling aims at experimenting with other ways to shape a community through narratives that point to future possibilities rather than harking back to categories inherited from original myths. This makes them 
